Distribution of Estates to Beneficiaries Behind the Iron Curtain by Freedman, Bernard
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 12 




Distribution of Estates to Beneficiaries Behind the Iron Curtain 
Bernard Freedman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bernard Freedman, Distribution of Estates to Beneficiaries Behind the Iron Curtain, 12 Buff. L. Rev. 630 
(1963). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol12/iss3/16 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ 
University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized 
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
compulsory insurance laws are passed, from whose injury the claim for damages,
compensatory and punitive, arises. Thus, recovery from insurance companies
for punitive as well as compensatory damages should be possible.
WALrR W. MnILam, JR.
DIsTInunoN OF ESTATES TO BENEFiciARIES BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN
Three perplexing questions are manifest in the area of distribution of
estates to beneficiaries residing behind the Iron Curtain. First, will the legatees
actually receive the beneficial use or control of the funds so that the intent of
the testator will be effectuated? Should these funds be allowed to leave the
country despite the possibility that they might be used to aid our nation's
enemies? Finally, should the state or the federal government control this area?
Distribution of these estates is, of course, important to the parties directly
involved. Furthermore, the interested countries have shown concern about these
funds. In fact, Iron Curtain powers have even interpreted their currency
regulations in an attempt to facilitate distribution of estates to beneficiaries
residing within their borders.1
Mechanically, the administration by the surrogate is easily explained. If
the decedent leaves funds to be distributed in a Communist-controlled country,
the surrogate determines whether the beneficiary will receive the actual control
of the legacy. If he decides that the beneficiary will not receive such benefit,
then the funds are deposited with an appropriate treasurer.2 The focal point of
this article will be an analysis of the criteria used by a surrogate in New York
in determining whether the amount should be distributed or deposited, and
whether in making such a decision the surrogate is invading or encroaching
upon the foreign relations power of our federal government. Section 269-a(1)
of the Surrogate's Court Act provides in part:
Where it shall appear that a legatee, distributee or beneficiary of a
trust would not have the benefit or use or control of the money or
other property due him, or where other special circumstances make it
appear desirable that such payment should be withheld, the decree
may direct that such money or other property be paid into the
surrogate's court for the benefit of such legatee, distributee, benefici-
ary of a trust or such person or persons who may thereafter appear
to be entitled thereto.
There are similar provisions in the New York Civil Practice Act.8 Section 269-a
1. In the Matter of Tybus, 28 Misc. 2d 278, 279, 217 N.Y.S.2d 913, 919 (Surr. Ct.
1961), citing 9 Polish Law Reg. or Journal (Feb. 19, 1951) containing decree of Feb. 3,
1947 (translated -in decree of Feb. 3, 1947, Title I, article 4 on file with U.S. Embassy in
Warsaw).
2. N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act § 269-a(1) (1939), as amended L. 1960, ch. 975.
3. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 474, 978 (1939).
RECENT DECISIONS
(1), formerly section 269, 4 was proposed at the time Nazi Germany was
beginning to extend its arm over Europe0 The avowed purpose of this statute
-was to "authorize the deposit of money or property by the Surrogate's Court
in cases where the transmission or payment to a . . . resident in a foreign
country might be circumvented by confiscation in whole or in part."6
There have been approximately fifty-one cases dealing with this area that
have been reported since the enactment of this statute. The cases have involved
only Nazi-dominated "or Communist-controlled nations, although by its defini-
tion section 269-a(l) could be directed against countries with whom we are
basically friendly. In these fifty-one cases, the surrogates generally have used
two criteria to determine whether to distribute or deposit the funds. These
criteria fall into the self-labeled categories of Treasury regulation and stare
decisis. The first of these criteria is based on a Treasury Department regulation
dealing with the matter of United States Government checks payable in Com-
munist-controlled countries. It states:
The Secretary of the Treasury hereby determines that postal, trans-
portation, or banking facilities in general or local conditions in Al-
bania, Bulgaria, Communist-controlled China, Czechoslovakia, Es-
tonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Rumania, The Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, the Russian zone of occupation of Germany, and
the Russian sector of occupation of Berlin, Germany are such that
there is not a reasonable assurafice that a payee in those areas will
actually receive checks or warrants drawn against funds of the United
States, or agencies or instrumentalities thereof, and be able to negoti-
ate the same for value.
7
In In the Matter of Braiers the New York Court of Appeals expressed its
approval of the surrogate's reliance upon this declaration and stated that
despite such reliance the distribution of such estates was "beyond and outside
the scope of the federal law."19 The Court added that "the area covered by the
New York provision (section 269) could not have been pre-empted by the
national enactment."' 0 Thus, a. Treasury regulation applying to an area of
negotiable instruments was interpreted to be official federal policy controlling
distribution of estates under state law-although the United States State De-
partment has never expressly endorsed such an application of the Treasury
regulation. On the contrary, it has repeatedly stated that distribution of estates
to heirs in Communist countries is not restricted by Federal law." The use
4. N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act § 269-a(1) (1939), as amended L. 1960, ch. 975.
S. Chaitkin, The Rights of Residents of Russia and Its Satellites to Share in Estates
of American Decedents, 25 So. Cal. L. Rev. 297, 298 (1952).
6. Comment, 14 Nichols-Cahill, N.Y. Ann. Civ. Prac. Acts, 398; see, to the same
effect, Chaitkin, supra note 5 at 300.
7. 31 C.F.R. § 211.3 (1957). Poland had been listed, 16 Fed. :eg. 1818 (1949).
8. 305 N.Y. 148, 154, 11 NE.2d 424, 426 (1953), appeal dismissed sub. nom. Kalmane
v. Green, 346 U.S. 802 (1953).
9. Ibid.
10. Supra note 8.
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of the regulation is questionable for if the purpose of section 269-a(l) was
only to effectuate the intention of the testator, reliance on the regulation to
determine whether the fund should be distributed presents a basis for arguing
that the New York statute is now interpreted with the effect of regulating
foreign policy.
Many post-1953 cases, by citing In the Matter of Braier12 indirectly rely
upon the Treasury regulation. Thus the principle of stare decisis is the second
criterion used by the surrogates.
Additionally, and perhaps rather independently, some surrogates have used
other criteria in rendering their decision. These include: judicial notice that
the country of which the distributee is a resident is Communist-controlled,
13
lack of proof that the distributee will have the benefit, use or control of the
fund,' 4 letters received from the executive departments of the Federal govern-
ment which state that distributees will not have the benefit, use or control of
the fund,. 5 and evidence that the exchange rate in existence will not allow
the distributee to have benefit, use or control of the fund.'6 The most unusual
criterion used to date was a visit to Poland by a surrogate to determine whether
the distributee would have the benefit, use or control of the fund.
17
Of the fifty-one cases examined, four used the Treasury regulation ex-
clusively. Three relied on judicial precedent in conjunction with the Treasury
regulation. Others cited the Treasury regulation in conjunction with some
of -the miscellaneous factors.
Two recent decisions in this area are of special interest. In loannou v. New
York' 8 a resident of England, the niece and assignee of the beneficiary resid-
ing in Czechoslovakia, was refused permission to withdraw the funds deposited
for her aunt under the New York statute. On appeal, petitioner argued that
section 269 (now 269-a(1)) did not prohibit this gift nor the release of the
funds to a resident of England. However, the New York Court decided that
the assignee, resident of England, could not be placed in a more preferred posi-
tion than the assignor, resident of Czechoslovakia (a member of the Soviet
Bloc).
In the second case, In the Matter of .Tybus,'9 the surrogate decided, after
traveling to Poland, that the fund should be distributed. During his visit he
conferred with the United States Ambassador to Poland, the Secretary to the
Embassy, the American Consul, members of the Association des Juristes
Polonais, members of the Bar Association of Warsaw, the Director-General of
12. 305 N.Y. 148, 11 N..2d 424.
13. See attached chart for year 1952.
14. See attached chart for year 1962.
15. See attached chart for years 1957 and 1959.
16. See attached chart foi year 1959.
17. In the Matter of Tybus, 28 Misc.2d 278, 217 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Surr. Ct. 1961)
(Poland).
18. 371 US. 30 (1962). See attached chart.
19. 28 Misc.2d 278, 217 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Surr. Ct. 1961).
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the Ministry of Finance and many other people both of official and unofficial
capacity. From these consultations, he concluded that the Polish beneficiaries
would receive use and control of the fund.
In order to determine whether the action by New York surrogates in this
group of cases interferes with the federal foreign relations power, it is
necessary to delve into analogous constitutional law problems. These collateral
problems were discussed by Justice Douglas in Ioannou v. New York.20
When a state law conflicts with a treaty the state law will be superceded. 2'
The question arises-is it necessary to await treaty action in this area? "Yet
even in absence of a treaty a state's policy may disturb foreign relations."
22
If a state statute were to bar admission of a Czechoslovakian visitor or if the
state were to prohibit travel of its citizens to foreign countries, it would be
struck down.2 3 The administration of our foreign relations is committed to the
Executive and Legislative branches of our government. These are the political
departments of the Federal Government, and the propriety of what may be
done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry.2 '
In the field of commerce a state is prevented from regulating even its
local affairs if their regulation imposes a direct undue burden upon interstate
commerce.25 A slight burden may come within this definition of direct burden
if "the purpose for imposing it does not justify a regulation that in fact inter-
feres with interstate commerce."2 6 Section 269-a(l) may only be a slight
regulation of the federal foreign power. Even this slight regulation should not
have to await an "overriding federal policy, ''2 7 to be superceded as an interfer-
ence with powers vested solely in our national government.
Each state may, of course, establish procedures for probating wills and
administering them,28 and if there is no overiding federal policy, the state
procedure should be honored.2 9 Descent and distribution of property in one
state to the citizens of another state is clearly a proper subject of interna-
tional relations.30 However, "complete power over international affairs is in the
national government and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or
interference of the part of the several states."''  Despite the holding in In the
Matter of Braler,32 have the New York courts regulated an area of our interna-
tional relations? Certainly the use of Treasury regulations as an aid to determin-
20. Supra note 18.
21. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961).
22. Ioannou v. New York, supra note 18, at 31.
23. Ibid.
24. Oetjen v. Central Leather Company, 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
25. Rottschaffer, Handbook of American Constitutional Law 277 (1939).
26. Id. at 284, citing Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Portland, 286 U.S. 325 (1925).
27. Clark v. Allen, 331. U.S. 503 (1947).
28. Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 193 (1938).
29. Ioannou v. New York, supra note 18, at 31.
30. Asakura v. Seattle, 256 U.S. 332 (1942); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890);
Haunstein v. Lynbam, 100 U.S. 483 (1879).
31. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
32. Supra note 12.
RECEN T DECISIONS
ing whether to distribute the funds indicates that the surrogates are effectuat-
ing foreign policy. Furthermore, the fact that money was distributed to
Yugoslavia 3 and Poland,34 countries which though behind the Iron Curtain are
on friendlier terms with the United States than the other Communist-controlled
nations, indicates that the New York surrogates are actually deciding these
cases on the basis of foreign policy rather than on the intention of the testator.
Of course, this conclusion can only be tested by a case involving a country
that is basically unfriendly with the United States but that has a favorable
currency system. The surrogate's visit to Poland in the Tybus 35 case is a prime
example of the problems that can arise in this area if the federal government
does not assert control. The surrogate in that case acted in the capacity of an
unofficial ambassador. The Supreme Court of the United States had an oppor-
tunity in the Ioannou" case to clarify this muddied area. However, the major-
ity believed that the case did not raise any substantial federal question.
BE N Aw FREEmrAN
33. In the Matter of Offinger, 28 Misc.2d 633, 215 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Surr. Ct. 1961).
34. In the Matter of Tybus, supra note 17.
35. Ibid.
36. Ioannou v. New York, supra note 18.
